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Abstract
Worker-posted performance bonds are a potential solution to trie agency problem which
arises when worker effort is not perfectly observable by tne firm Yet the explicit posting of
performance bonds is rarely observed Since the firm should prefer a contractual arrangement
which entails performance bonds to one which relies on efficiency wages, because the bonding
contract yields lower unit labor cosis, an explanation for the iaci< of bonds in actuality is required.
We propose such an explanation based on the idea that the implicit contract must resolve the firm
moral hazard conc^erninq bona expropriation. We model this moral hazard as a loan default
problem When the value of tne firm is less than the value of the posted performance bonds, the i
firm will expropriate the bonds and go out of business. Workers will willingly post performance
|
bonds when thy know that this inequality is reversed. In an environment v/here the firm is
subject to a series of random snocks which are not observed by its workers, these workers will be ,
unable to determine the value of the firrri Vv'e. aemonstrate that in such an environment the >
t
t
I
optimal implicit contract may require the firm to pay wages to workers in excess of their
;
J
reservation wage, when labor productivity and thus labor demand is high. These efficiency wages "
act both as a signal to workers that there is no tnreat of bond expropriation and as an inceniive
devic.e to elicit effort
.

I. Introduction
Worker -posted perforrriance bonds oooear lo be a viable soiuiion lo tne agencv Drobierri
which arises when worker ei'fort is not perfecuy ooservabie by The firm and, consequcnr ly , wnen
the firm must generate incentives for its worKers to put forth effort Such oonamg conrracts, if
feasible, obviate the need for the firm to pay its workers in excess of tneir reservation wage, as
suggested by the recently developed efficiency wage theory ^ However , the explicit posting of
performance bonds is rarely observed. Moreover, recent work by Abraham and Farber ( 1 987)
suggests that even implicit bonding arrangem.ents, in the form of uoward sloping w.^ge- earnings
profiles steeper than their concomitant productivity profiles, are less significani i.nan was
previously suspected/' Thuf;, one is led to :<-eK explanations for why ooncing does not occur more
often.
The main theoretical argument that has been advanced to date as an expianation for mis
puzzle is that workers are liguidity constrained and, thus, unaDle to put up the reguisite bond.
Although this explanation may be plausibie in ceriam cases, its general appiicaoiiity faces severe
limitations, because the explanation appears to reguire that wnen workers are somewnat iiguia
the firm will require these worKers to oost ail available casn as performance oono, so 'hat worker
compensation need not be as high as it would oe were there exclusive reliance on efficiency wages.
This implies that the firm, should rank its job applicants, who are otnerv/ise similar
,
on the basis
of their relative liquidity. Moreover , to tne extent that the firm can oerceive liauidity differences
among its existing workforce, internal wage differentials should arise We oeiieve thai tnis is the
wrong line of approach to explain the lack of bending in actuality, though liquidity constraints m,3y
bind in many instances
' See, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (198'1) and Bulow and Summers i;986) Vellen (1964). Akerlcf
and Yellen (1986), and Kalz (1966) provide interesting reviews of tne efMciency wage literature
2 See. for example. Medoff and Abraham (1980).
Oij" preferred exp;ar;a*ior, taKe? as its oasis the ;'irm rnoral tiazard concerning bond
e'xDroDr ia;ion in ine eiticiency wage literature, this morai r:azarG is usuaiiv described as the
firm deiiberateiy mislabeiing its workers as shirkers, it nas oeen argueo tnat tnis moral hazard
is soived Through the firm's desire to maintain its reputation in me lahor marKet.-" ^ Tne
argument is that upon reneging, recruiting costs go up sufficiently to more than offset the gains
resulting from bond expropriation. In a recent paper , we argue Thai Donding will dominate
efficiency wages, when such reputational effects are viaDie,^ However , the resulting equilibrium
does not yield the first best solution. Although the labor market clears in this equilibrium , firms
miust earn reputational renis whicn are themselves distortiongry , when comparea to the solution
where the firm moral hazard is apsent in our curren* paper , we assume instantaneous anc
certain detection of bona expropriation, in order lo simplify the model ana avoid extraneous
issues, pariiculariy The quesTion ()i now oetection of The i'.r^'. moral hazarc occurs.'' inen we view
the firmi moral hazard as a loan default problem Thai is, when the firm expropriates bond it takes
the bond of all Us workers simultaneously."^ We also assume tnat ihe firm ceases operation once
-"' See, for example, Akerlof ana Yellen i'l'j'dS).
^ Several authors have suggested mechanisms other than reputation to resolve the f'-rm mioral hazard
probienri in contracts with tiondinq. For example, Carmichael ( 1965) argues that the problem can be
eliminated through the use of thira party repositories for the performance bonds and through the
designation of recipients of performance bonds tnat are appropriated m the event that some workers are
detected shirking, other than the firm. Other authors, eg , Dickens et al (1987), 'r)3\'e taken the opposite
approach, arguing that there are lirriits to bonding arrangements aside from the fi'~nri moral hazard In
particular, it is argued that incentive schemes which rely on disproportionately large punishments as
compared to the crime they dre designed to deter, cannot be in-ipiemiented, i e , such punishments will not
hold up in a court of law. Still others, e g , Halcolmson ( 1964'. suggest that the problem can be resolved
through the use of r,?nk order tournaments, whereby the firms compensation to its workforce is made
state independent yet incentives for workers to put forth effort are preserved We a priori rule out the
possibility of utilizing third parties, to avoid the issue of the limitations placed on contracts through legal
enforcement constr'aints. We also note that the option for the firm to default on its labor contract is
typically ignored as a possibility in the tournament literature Thus, our approach can be viewed as filling
In this gap
5 See Arvan and Esfahani (1987)
^ This assumiption is also made in Arvan and Esfahani ( 1987) See note 8,
' In Arvan and Esfahani (1987) we show that there is no ioss in generality lo restricting attention to the
case of full bond expropriation, since the maximum credible punishment will be applied to the firnri when it
expropriates, regardless of how many workers lose their bond.
exproDriation ha? taken olace,'^ Then, -vvorkers will be reluctant to post bond unless tnev believe
mat the value ol Uie firm given thai the firm honors the implicit coniract eACeeas ihe value ot ;he
firm given that the firm reneges via bond expropriation
We question the viability of the reputation mechanism by considering a stochastic,
environment with information asymmetries. We assume that the firm experiences random
productivity shocks. These productivity shocks affect the value of the firm Workers are assumed
to be unable to determine whether default is an attractive option to the firm , because workers
cannot observe the realization of the current shocK. In this respect our model borrows from tne
literature on implicit contracts under asymmetric information '^ It turns out that in our model
bond expropriation is an attractive option to the firm when it is actually in tne low productiviiy
state but clairris to be in the hign productiviTy si.ate. The optimal contract must either convince
workers that bond expropriation is not a thre.at, Dy giving a signal to workers about the firm's
True state, or compensate them for the possidiI iTy oi expropriation risk. 'When the former is tne
c.a3e, our model appears similar to the model of Milgrom and Roberts ( 1 986), who analyze price
and advertising signals of product quality in an experience good market. Their acnievemeoT is to
consider a multidimensional signal , The product-price and advertising-expenditure pair , to
explain tne presence of noninformative advertising. Signaling in our model is also acnieved via a
multidimiensional signal, the wage, performance bond, and employment triple, in addition to
viewing contract offers as signals, our model explicitly considers both tne worker moral hazard
concerning shirKing and the firm moral hazard concerning bond expropriation A further feature
which differentiates our approacn from Milgrom and Roberts is that they only consider one snot
uncertainly while we allow for an underlying stochastic process to generate workers' uncertainty
In Milgrom and Roberts' paper, all doubt aoout the firm's underlying characteristics is eliminaTed
*
'v^hen oetection of bond expropriation 15 both instantaneous and certain, the firm qomg out of business
constitutes ttie maximum credible punist'iment that workers can impose on the firm, as we showed m our
previous paper. Weaker forms of punishment, such as increased recruiting costs, wi!! sustain equilipna
which are Pareto dominated by the equilibria described in this paper
^ See the entire OJE (1935.) supplement and Hart(l983) for a very good survey of this literature.
once Duver?. learn about, the oroduct quality associated with the firm in question Thus, as they
readily admit, their mncei is best interoretea as explaining nonini'ormaiive advertising (or a riew
product, in our mode: , even if workers are currently sure about the firm's productivity because
the current coniraci. offer is a perfectly informative signal, workers will be genuinely uncertain
about the value of the firm in the next period because there is a new shock in that period. Indeed,
our approach could oe readily applied to the product quality issue to explain persistent
advertising.
The basic model we consider is essentially an extension of the cogent efficiency wage model
develooed by Shaoiro and Stlqlitz ( 1 964) Vve extend their model to a stochastic contract game
which allows for tne possibility of performianc^ bonds, and hence for an analysis of the firm moral
hazard problem. We viev* the problem of long term contract determination as one of constructing a
sequential equilibr'um for rh:s fXinirac' qame. ^ in, fact, we restrict attention to tne particular
refinement of sequential equilibrium gwen by tne intuitive or]terion^ This solution concept is
suitable since the issue of whether worKers are willing to post performance bonds depenos
crucially on their Del lefs about firm profitability. We assume that the underlying uncertainty of
the game is generated by a very simple Markov process. This allows us to provide an explicit
characterization of \\\?. equilibrium
As a consequence of the workers' uncertainty about firm value, the firmt does not
necessarily rely exclusively on performance bonds to provide workers with the appropriate
incentives when its productivity, and conse^Duently its employment, is high. Instead, the firm mary
utilize efficiency wages, in part The reliance on efficienc-/ w^ages occurs when firm employment
is sufficiently great that there would be a risk of bond expropriation, were the firm in the low
productivity state Performance bonds will still be utilized by the firm in such an equilibrium,
but not to the extent that they would be were the firm's productivity observable Moreover, the
greater the value of the firm's shxk in the high productivity state the greater the volume of
^ ^ See Kreps anr! Wilson ( 1 982).
^' SeeChoand Kreps(l987).
employment ir; the riiah prcductiviTy state, ana nence, the greater- the reliance on eftiClencv wage?
Thus, our model precicts a positive correlation between wages anc firm s;:e, a well f nown sTylizec
fact of the labor market that heretofore nas not beer^ explained adequately ' -
As an alternative to paying efficiency wages to signal high firm prodiiCtiviTy, [Ue firm
might find it preferable to not signal its productivity at all , but instead to comiperisaie wocKers for
expropriation risk. This tactic is more favorable for the firm when the workers' prior beliefs
put a lot of weight on the firm being in the high productivity state, since the size of tne
compensating differential is small in this case. This suggests that when workers are sufficiently
optimistic, pooling rather than separating equilibria will prevail However , as we show in the
paper, this intuition is not correct. As long as worker prior beliefs are not helc with ceri.ainty
,
the firm in the high productivity state has sufficient incentive to signal Us oroductiviiv Thai any
pooling equilibrium involving compensating differentials is undermined.
In addition to explaining wny firms pay efficiency wages, our miodel resolves another
paradox which has troubled the efficiency wage literature: When firmis pay efficiency wages to
workers, why don't they charge entry fees up front ;n order to recapture the renis emoeddea m the
efficiency wage payments? (lore importantly, when such entry fees are uti lizec, doesn't The
involuntary unemployment associated with efficiency wage theory vanish, since eacn worker's
lifetime compensation, inclusive of the entry fee, eguals wnat the worker coulc earn at nis next
best opportunity? ' ^ In our model , we allow the firm to charge eacn worker such an up front
paymeni, as per Carmichael's suggestion. Yet in our signaling equilibrium, tne marqinal value
product of the firm in the high productivity state exceeds the worker's reservation wage, in fact
,
this marginal value product even exc-eeds the efficiency wage' Thus, we demonstrate that the
'*• biandard efficiency wage theory argues that monitoring intensity varies inversely with firm si^e For
example see Katz (1936). This may indeed be the case. But such a negative correlation need not iniply a
positive correlation between firm size and wages, when one allows that performance bonds ^rt viable In
addition, there does not appear to be a compelling reason for assuming that small firois have a
comparative advantage in monitoring Our explanation holds true under the assumotion that monitoring
intensity is constant, regardless of firm size, and remains true under the assumption that miomtonng
intensity varies inversely with firm size
'^ See the exchange between Carniichael (1985) and Shapiro and Stiglitz(l985)
cnarqinq of up ''rorit fe&:- is compatible with involuntary unenripinvrrient. Our result follows
Decause tne f ir m musi convince us employees ihai 'here ^s no nsK of Dona expropr ;ation. This
places The loilowinQ sionalinq constraint on the firm, wnen m me nign pr oductivity s'aie. The
equi iibnum payoff to the firm when in the low productivity staie shoulo be at least as large as the
payoff that ihe firm in the low productivity state would ootain were it to offer the equilibrium
contract for the firm in the higti. proouctivity state followed oy it expropnaimq the performance
bonds associated with this contract. This signaling constraint appears as an upward sloping curve
in employment-wage space. That is, the firm in the high productivity state acts as if its supply of
labor is not perfectly elastic, as long as the contract it offers calls for some degree of performance
bonds. Furthermore, the firm in the hiqn productivity staie does not charge an entry fee to its
employees, since ooing so would only tighten tne signal ir.g constrairii. These fees are charged to
workers when the firm is in the low produc'ivi'v state. The higher the efficiency wage paid in The
hign producnvity siaie, the higner the fee col lec'ed in the low productivity state However
,
sequential rationality imposes the restriction mat the firm ooes not internalize this benefit. This
is the crucial insight of the paper.
The rest of this paper is organizeo as loiiows, m section li we provice a sin":piified, one-
per icd version of the moijel tc provide some intuition tor now efficiency wages work to signal firnri
value, in section iil we provide the basic set up of the general , infinite horizon mocel in section
IV we Discuss some of the main properties of separating equilibr lum. !n section V we characterize
equilibrium. Finally, we offer a orief conclusion in section vl.
II. A Diagrammatic Approach
In this section we provide a simplified, one period version of our model to give an iaea of
how efficiency wages are used to signal firm value and to suggest those cases where such a signal
v/ill be utilized. Suppose a firm c^n be in one of two possible states, either m or A' where state
m Is less favorable to the firm than state M. Assume that the realization of the state is private
in'^oriTia* -on ^'leid tv '''e i^rTi , vp , wnr>-e:~s cannot oDse^ve the firm's stats. Let U oeriote the
iitcti-ne v^iue 01 trie *irTn whep u (S in state u for u = m^M. L' < U ^.. Assume the tirTn'sooiv
iT; I i
input IS laDor ana thg: tr;e fir.T;s choice prot^iem is to select the profit maximizina employment
contract from among inose contracTs vvhich workers will find acceptable. In this simplifiea
version of our model
, a amtract is a pair
,
( vr\ i ) , where W is the contract wage and L is the
voiume of employrnent.
Workers can earn the reservation wage, W r,, t?y seeking employment elsewhere. Hence,
W 1 Wn is a necessary condition for contract acceptability. In addition, suppose that
empla/mient with me firm neoessuaies thai 'workers post a performance bond of value P The
other neces'sary ccncition which governs c-oniract acceptability is that workers must oelieve thai
the firmi won t expropriate the performance ooncs mat ihey post. We elaborate on this condition
he low
Suppose that if the coniraci ( W .L ) if. accepted then the current period profit of the firm
in state u isn( u, ^V,l ) and suppose that if, m addition, the firm expropriates the performance
bones then its lifetime value is n( p , ^y,l )*- r>"Z , for \!^-m,M. If workers were primiarily
CJiincerned about expropriation by the firm, when its state is m
,
they would not accept a contr.x.t
which satisfied: U
,, n( m , W .l )+ /^Z . When this inequality is reversed workers should be
111
cwvinced that there is no risk of bond expropriation. We v^a^^ to the constraint:
U 2 n( /?; , W\L ) as the signaling constraint, SC, because when it is violated workers beliefs
will assign high prooability to tne firmi being in state m The firmi can only convince its workers
thai It is m state M bv offering a contract which satisfies the SC
Assume that n exhibits the rol lowing properties; n > 0, n ,., ^ 0, n
,
,
'- 0, and n , > 0.
M r/ LL U zl
Let L
^^1
-
- ^ n( M , li''r-,,l ) We focus on the oroblerri which determines the firnVs optimal
contract when the firm is m state /V, since in ej:]uil!brium it is only in this state that efficiency
wages are possible This problem is given by
rriaxirrr.ze
n( /Y, vt-', z ) subiect to ij > n( /?? , yV. I )^ pl
in figure i we qraon the so'mtion to this problem under the assumotion that the SC does
not Dind, Observe that the isoprofit curve is tangent to the horizontal line /"/ = /fn at Z/s-^and
the SC cuts tne horizontal line l^V = H'n at L. > l^f. This is necessary when the SC doesn't bind.
In figures 2 and 3 we graph the solution to this problem when the SC binds. We identify
two candidates as solutions of this problem. The appropriate choice depends on the respective
slopes of the isoprofit curves for the firm in state A/ and the SC. In figure 2 , there is an interior
solution This is the case where efficiency wages occur. The first oraer necessary condition in
tnis case is n . ( //, i'V.., Z ^.J == n ,{ m, ff' .-^ a-)"^ ^- The noht hand s^de of tnis eauation is
L I i I 1 L fill
positive when the SC is rising. When n
,
is inierpreted as the difference between the margma!
value product of labor and the wage and when the tangency point occurs on the rising pc^tion o^ the
SC, the marginal value proauct of labor exceeds the efficiency wage, \V
^^\ in this sense our model
predicts even grosser allocative inefficiency than the standard eff icienisy wage model . such as
Shapiro and Stiglitz ( 1 9S4). In figure 3. there is a corner solution
,
( KS.^.Z ,,) = ( V/n.Lr.).
Efficiency wages hrb not utilized in this case, though there is evidently allocative inefficiency
relative to the first oest solution where v/orkers can observe the firm's state. The first order
necessary condition in this case, n , ( t1 ,
^^V>,/q) 'LTi a m , r/^,Z,-,)+ B, indicates that the firm
finds It too costly to utilize efficiency wages to expand its employment.
in the subsequent sections we expand on this basic mcdel in order to endogenize those
values which were taken parametrically in this simplified version. However, the m,ain message
remains mt.act when going to the full model: Efficiency wages are utilized to signal the firm's state
and tnereby to convince workers that there is no risk of bond expropriation This signaling
distorts the laoor allocation relative to the first best solution Moreover , we are able to show that
this distortion remains, even when the firm charges its employees up front fees, so that over the
lifetim.e of employment workers only earn their reservation wage.
MFigure 1
W SC
Wk
isoprofit
curves
M M
Figure 2
W
Wr
isoprofit
curves
Figure 3
Hi. Preliminaries
There are three commcidlties in the moaei a proauced qooa, labor -leisure, ana a stocK
commodity which serves as numeraire. There are two types of agents, the firm and workers
Workers are identical in every respect except employment status. Each worker is infinitely lived
and endowed with both an indivisible unit of labor- leisure and enough of the numeraire stock to oe
able to post the requisite bond, should the worker choose to do so. Worker preferences are
specified by the rate of time preference, /", which coincides with the market interest rate, and a
oer period von Neumann-Morgensiern utility function defined over leisure ana numeraire
consumption. As is typical in this literature, we assume thai, workers are risk neuira! Workers
who are employee by the firm ge; to cnoose their level of effort , £?s [ , 1 1 When ..-= an
employed worker is t.aking leisure on ;he lob or .shirking When e= I the worker is oe.r.g
productive or putting forth effort. Intermediate values of <? are interpreted as either the fraction
of the time at work which the worKer puts forth effort or the probability that the worker ooes not
shirk. The utility function is normalized so that v,'hen the worker is consuming y units of
numeraire and taking e units of effort . the per period utility is y-e The time invar lant
,
discounted, lifetime expected utility at the worker's best alternative employment is denoted by i-',,
and is assumed to be a nonnegaiive number.
The production function of the firm
, I , is defined over the effective labor input Z'' In
what follows all workers will be choosing the same effort level , in which case Z^= eL wnere e is
the common effort level. Ii is assumed that { is increasing, differentiabie, and strictly concave In
addition, j(0)=0, lim , . . j'( Z) = », and lirn
.^ _^
{( Z) = 0. The firm is subiect to a random,
privately observed, internal price. Let u . be the random, variable denoting this price in period /
We assume that u . takes on only two values, either /n or A/; with < m< /^/. We also assume
that the stochastic process (p A
^ ^^
is a Markov chain with transition probabilities given by
10
Pp(m =,':'7:'j - 'Vv = ,^- ^nd -riu . = rn\i\ ^= n-/] - 1> Assume < l? < if? '• 1 The firm 1-^ taken
to maximize di'^coijnied exoect&c oroMTS, wnere the discount rate is tiie marKet interest rate, r
Eocr, penoc ;hat the firm is iri operauon is oroken down into four stages of cecision, In the
first staqe, the firm offers a contracl A contract in oenod / 1s an ordered 5-tuple, C,,
C- ( W,.B,S .,F ..f^ i). where rV , is the waae rate to be paid to each employed worker, d . is((.if',.; 1 ' (
the pe!"formance Dond to oe oosted Py each employed worker , Z ^ is the volume of employment
should the contract he acceoted, F^ is the fee paid t^y workers who are in the firm's reserve pool
,
and R , is the size of the reserve pool. The pool of workers to whom the firm may offer a contract
in penoc t. in order of priority, consists of first, thos* workers em.pia/ed by the firm in period
/- / who are m qooa standina, second, those workers in the firm's reserve pool in period t-
1
;
ono tn:rd, "vOe outside wo^Kers who are unemployed in period / and seek employment frorri ^'j\t
firrri ;n mat period, '/vithin each of the^-e priority ciasstfiication joos are alloc^ited on a pro rata
Pasis
In the second stage eacn worker who is offered the contract either accepts it or rejects it.
The contract is null and void in the event that the firm cannot find L , v/orkers to accept it. In this
case, me remaining Vvvn Mages are foregone and tne firm, necessarily continues operation into
period '+ i Any worker wno dia accept the contract is freed from this obligation and entitled to
seek empiovment eisewnere ;n perioo / Similarly, each worker who is offered a slot m the
reserve ooci eitne'' acceots ! or rejects it, .Acceptance requires payment of the fee, r ^, which is
nonrefund-aPle Workers in the reserve pool c-an obtain emiployment elsewhere in period /, i.e.
,
they can earn rv
^
j'\ i-r) in the period indeed, our reason for including a reserve pool m tne
model is that when -aPor contracts call for efficiency wages, workers earn rents and thus should
be willing to pay for the rignt to emplioyment. ' '^ The firm could extract such a pa^/ment by
hoarcing worKers. encouraging them to shirk , and capturing the performance bonds of those
workers it caught shirking When the workers' reservation wage is positive, this is an
'^ See Carmirjtael (19851
1!
ineiTicient mecnon'T.rr, for extracting such payments. The reserve pool mechanisrr, , wnsre
vvorrers pav fcr trie right to be ottered employment when vacancies appear but may worK
elsewhere m the meantime, is superior
The contr-xt is operational when Z, workers accept it. Once the contract is operational ,.
each ot the i , emolo^/ees receives the wage ^V. and posts the bond £^, . Thus the net pa^/ment made
by the tirm to each emp!o^/ee at this juncture is ^'^r^/. which may be positive or negative. In the
th'rd stage, each worker chooses i?.. This choice is not observed by the firm. Instead, the firm
has a chance of detecting the worker taking leisure on the job The detection probability is
( /-e,)B, where e is a parameter reflecting the firm's monitoring intensity, <8 < 1. In the
conclu(^inq section we briefly cxinsider the firm's problem when it is iree to cnoose tne magnitude
of 8 .
Once the tnirc' stage has occurred, production occurs and output is publicly observed Both
the firm and its workers are able to impute the effective labor input m per loa t, C\, via
observation of fi^m output and their knowledge of the production function, f. We assume that
there is a determ mistic relationship between Z^, Z^ , and. the number of workers detected
d d -=
shirkina in period /, Z.. This relationship is Given bv Z/=(Z,-Z'J8. The reason tor makino
L 'III
this assumption is that when there are layoffs, Z . , < Z
,-^^f . ^'"'e retention probability is
nonlinear in Z . , Hence, the value of future employment to workers currently under contract
could depend on noise in the detection of worker shirking, i.e., if L. were a random variable then
the value of future employment would depend on the distribution of this random variable. This
effect could conceivably offset our argument against labor hoarding.
Given Z .
,
the firm decides in the fourth stage to either coniinue operation into period
/+ 1 or cease ooeration at the end of period t When the firm has decided to continue operation,
all the workers wnn are detected shirking are fired and made to forfeit their performance bonds to
the firm. .All of the other L ri* workers are considered employees in good standing. At the start
12
of Dennd /+ 1 such emD!o\'ees aet bact, ( 1 + /) d ^ from the firm. When the firm decides lo cease
ODeraticn at the end oi 'jenoQ t , observation of l ^ is imrnater lal. in this case, ttie firm keeps tne
performance bonds of all its workers, regardless of whether they nave been detected shirking. The
game ends once the firm has decided to cease ooeraticn.
Our goal is to construct sequential equilibria m strategies where the history of pi3\' can be
completely summarized by workers" current beliefs about the firm's internal price. This
restriction on strategies appears natural given the Markovian structure of the underlying
uncertainty. • 5 !n order to construct such equilibria, we must first specify wha^ strategies and
beliefs are and then impose seauential rationality, on strategies, and consistency with Payes' Law
and with eauilibrium strategies, en beliefs. V/e shall do so in a 'ather informal manner , to save
on notation and thereby to enhance readability.
At the star t of oeriod /, workers will have genuine uncertainty as <.o the curreO' va'ue o''
the firm's internal price. Let a
^
represent the beliefs of workers that tne firm is in tne low
productivity state in period /, before the contract in period / is offered but after the play of the
game through period /- 1 has been completed, a
^
= Pr{u = m] The contract offer serves as a
signal of the firm's internal price. Letp^ represent these revised beliefs. Tnenp . = |3 (a ..^^),
I.e.
, the initial beliefs and contract offer map into revised beliefs. The consistenD/ reouirernent
restricts p via Bayes' Law for the equilibrium values of C.. but imposes no restriction on p for
out of equilibrium values of C. If the contract offer is not accepted by Z
,
workers, then Bayes'
Law requires that a
^_^
.=«./:''+( 1 -« J <^ If the contract in period / is operational , then
c-ontinuation of firm operation into period /+ 1 may also signal the firm's internal price in period
/ and hence provide information that is relevant in predicting the firm's internal price m oenod
t^\. Ttien Bayes' Law requires: a - ^
—
'
-
/^i- P,//,,,^ (i-P,)/^;//-/
•-^ Note, however, that this restriction on strategies is not innocuous The restriction has the effect of
taking away all the workers" bargaining power, in particular, under the restriction workers can't play
trigger strategies where they punish the firm, by not accepting the contract offer, unless tfie contract
provides employees with sufficient rents.
wnere H, denotes trie proDabilitv ^*iat the firm honors tne contr act qwen
I u ^= u
,
< u
-
.:
I'or u = m, M.
A strateg/ for a worker Is an orderec inole of functions. The firs* function maos initial
beliefs and contract offers into acceptance or rejection decisions This function governs the
employment decision. The se^xind function also maps initial beliefs and contract offers into
acceptances or rejections, Put this one governs the decision concerning entry into the reserve
pool. The third function maps revised beliefs and contract offers into effort levels. Thus the first
two functions govern play m stage two, while the third function governs play in stage three In
what follows we assume that all workers pursue tne same strategy/
A strategy for the firm is an orderec pair of functions. The first function maps tne firn-i's
internal price and wor,<ers' initial beliefs into contract offers. The second function maps the
firm's internal price, workers' revised beliefs, anGConiract offers into tne probabiiny of
honoring the CJiintract. The first function governs pla^/ in stage one, while tne second function
governs play in stage four,
lY. Separating Equilibrium
Suppose equilibrium of the game is characterized by contract offers which are inceoendent
of worker initial beliefs, at least for « e (0,1]. Letting C* denote the eauilibnum contract
offer function, we have C*{ m ,<x, ,) = C and C*{ A/.a J = C^ for all « , ^ 0. Moreover,1/7? in
suppose the equilibrium is seoarating. I.e. , ^ = C^ Then,p(a ..<:7 ) = 1 andp (a ,,(x^) =
for a .. 0, That is, upon observation of the equilibrium contract offers, workers act as if the/
know the realization of the firm's internal price. Also assume that theecuilibrium contract offers
are always ac-c^pte^j.
Before continuinq further, we introduce some notation to aid the exposition, Letn( \s,C.)
= uj( Z J- '^-^U.^ F. P' . The function n gives current period profit for a firm with inlernal
price u when it offers contract ^., which has been accepted and at which employees put forth
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efio't. Lei IT = ri'. n.C • andn ,,. = 11'. A'^^). Thus.n „ sndn .. denote ecu rntr-i urn
,::• /Z7 / .• n m n
current Denod pro^T^ ^or The firm with internal price equal to m and /V, respectively That is.
we 5S3ij''nee'noiOvee? do out forth effort m eauilibnum.'^ Let U and U., denote the
ITl f'l
equi libriijrn , lifetune, discounted expectea values of the firm with current interna; price equal to
m and A/, respectively. These values are given by
/ o . - ' ^'^ " '",7? ^ — -"a/- and
-^]
"/V
'
r [ ; + r -- ^ -^ ]
under the assuTiDtinn that the firm always honors the contract in equilibri:j''n, *^
i: the firm with internal price equal to m offered an unacceptaote contract, it would earn
zero profns m the current period and its lifetime expected value would De
[I' U^^ \':- l) 6\..: / ( 1 •*/-•). Since 6'^ = n
.
+ [l> O'^i \- ti) 0'J\/{ 1 -» r), individual
rationality require; that n „i 0. Similarly, individual rationality requires n ., 2 0. Thus,
either n „ = n ^_, = and conseQuentlv U,, = U^. = 0, in which case the equilibrium is trivial witr
i-i I ;
'
III I
the frrn never m operation, or max sn
_
, n
,....) > 0, in which case 0' , 0'^^ > 0, In fact, since
n ( /V, ^„ 1 n i rn ,C), with strict inequality when Z _> , and since n ., > n ( //, ^„ )
,
/77 ^ ,7i ri m
pecause ^.^ is a Pest response for the firm wnen its internal price is /7, it miust be that
max {n
,^.
.ji
.,,:
= n ^.. hence, in a nontrivial equilibrium , i'. > L' > 0. This is the case wemil'! 1 1 ffl
focus on below
C^r.-nsider the farm's stage four decision given that an arbitrary contract has been offered and
accented m period / and that the internal price is m. Were it to cease operation at the end of
period /. the firm would expropriate the performance bonds of all its workers who would
otherwise oe m good standing. The value of this expropriated bond is dX I.- Z .) =
•^ fhis IS shewn to be d necessary property of eqijilibrium m lemnna 1
'
'
This 15 3I50 shown to t>e a necessary properly of equilibrium in ienima 1
L X ^ ~( ' ~ i-'M]- Were the firm to continue operai.ion, the firm's lifetime, expected,
( (
discounted value equals [ fi 0'„^-^{ ]-/?) ifA.J/', l -^ r). Tnus, the v,rrr\ honors the contract only if
(2) cU/^- {]-/)) C/^^ 1 (l^r)/^^Z^[!-( i-.^je].
( 2) is termed the no expropriation condition for the firm in state m , NEC , where the
subscript refers to the current internal price of the firm. NEC^ is defined similarly for the firm
with current internal price equal to A/. Since d< z??. the NEC is more restrictive than the NECk..
The model was constructed so that this would he the case. Mote that the expropriation decision is
maeoendent of '4'., f,, and /?,, since these vanaDles are "sunf- " oy the third stage and have no
impact on either the effort decision or on the future profits of the firm. For a contract such that
me NtC^, is violatea out the NEC^ is satisfied, worker oeliefs are critical m determinina themil
extent of e.^.oropnation risk
, and hence, the value of acceotinq the contract C. . This ma^/ provide
a motive for the firm to signal Us workers wnen its internal price is /i. It is this motive which
explains why the firm might be willing to pay efficiency wages.
Frorri the workers' point of view, the effort decision in stage three depends on the current
disutility of effort, worker beliefs abcui the productivity of the firm
,
and the expected gains from
being in good standing at the eno of period / Let the equilibrium lifetimeexpectedutility of a
worker employed with the firm be y and /.,, when tfie current internal price of the firm is r/?
and //, respectively. Also, let the eouilibnum employment levels of the firm be L and L.. in
states /77 and A/, respectively. Then the lifetime, discounted expected value of an employee
under the contract C^ who has chosen the effort level e, is given by
V
KZ)v{e^. C^)= >'/.-^^-[e(i-^^)ni-e(i-.-^,)]/?.^^^,^}[y^-^^]-[i-8(i -^^)][i-/^^^^^^
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v/n.pre '^ IS tri<^ DroDeDiiuv inai the iirrr rerieaes on the contra'"t vis exLToonritiC'ri
. r -
P .( 1 - .V. )+ ( 1 -p Jv 1 - /V,,,,) , 5.,^ IS the proDaDihty that d wortcer in Qood stancnna st^.er
penod / IS retained by the firm Qiven |u
,
,=rp].s.= min (Z ,,,'[ l-e( 1 - i=,)j Z ., '1, aria
;
"^
1 (/77 'ill t i
s.^. is defined simildrly given (u
,_^
,=/'/) Note that the individual employee takes 5.^ and 5,^,^,
as parameters. The effort level used to evaluate tnese parameters is the common effort of the
employee's coworkers. To better understand (3), consider the expression term by term, The
first term is the wage minus the disutility of effort. The second term is the product of the
probability of losing the oerformance bond, both through detec:ion of shirking and throijgh
expropriation by the firm , and the difference between the value of being employee elsewhere m
the subseguent period and i\\e value of the lost bond. The third term is the pi^oduci of tne
probability that the worker is in gocc standing in period /+ i given that tne firm operates in that
period, the probaoility that tne firm operates in period ^+ I
. and the expected value 'o a wori er
who is in good standing when the firm, operates in period <'+ 1
.
Each employee under contract chooses e. to maximize ( 3.). Obsei" ve that ( 3) is linear m t\
so that the-^e is alwa\'s a corner oot-mum The condition that e,- 1 yields a maximum is termed
the No Shirking Condition, NSC, and is given oy
The first com.ponent of a worner's st^atei^ is governed by the empliT/men* accep'
condition
. EAC. This condition is g;ven by
(5) max[ /(0,^J, y\ 1,^/;] ^ V
Workers will not accept an employment offer when ( 5) is violated.
The .:.econi3 comporieni of a worker's siraieijy is Qoverneo rjy tne reserve pool accepiance
conduion, RAC S^rice There iS no exproprtatiori risK for those -workers who are ofiereo a Dosition
in ine firms reserve dooi, tnis concition is Qiven by
lb) \\-p..^.j T—.
where g^ ^ is tne orohability that a worker who is in the reserve pool in penod / gains
empla/ment from the firm which is in state u in period /+ 1 . for u =/7?. n
. g,^^
= mm n . max [0, ( Z - Z . + Z v)/ /? J)
Let a^ and a^^. denote the equilibrium effort levels and le* A'^ and H^^^ denote the
eauiiiDnum proPaoilities that the firm honors the contract m states m and /7, respectively. As
we nave air^eaci/ noted, ^^j^t^^f ^^\,-'^k^ = ' Selow we demonstrate why this is necessarily the
case It IS simple to see that .H ,H^, *0 For were this not the case, then from ( 6) it is apparent
that no worker would he willing to pa-v to enter the reserve pool. Moreover , from (4) it is just
as apparent that all emiployed workers would shirk Hence, the EAC reduces to Vy'- B . i
rV { I -^ r) > m this rase But sinre firm prnfi^ per employee would De 8 - w, and firm
operation would cease after perioa ^ the firm would be oetter off oifenn.g an unacceptable
contract in period t so that it could continue operation into per ioq ''+ 1
.
In lemma 1 we show that intermediate values of H and .^^.can beruledout a? well- The
imuition for this result is that were such ranaomizirig optimal
.
the firm would necessarily be
indifferent between continuing operation and expropriating the bonds. But when the firm
randomizes over its decision to expropriate the performance bonds or honor the contract, Us
employees face some expropriation risk. As a result, a compensating differential must be
embedded in the contract wage, to induce the employees to accept the expropriation risk The firm
could offer an alternate contract, by reducing the size of the bonds posted by its workers, thereby
eliminating ttie expropriation risk and, consequently, lowering the wage which workers find
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occeptabie. When ine aitHmate oontrcict nas the prooerty thai it is less orofitaDie to the firm
,
vs-ere it m trie oiner jT^t.:;, :.riar, tne HQuiiibrium contract offered by the firm when in the other
st.aie, workers' revised beliefs should be the sam,e whether the original contract or the alternate
contract IS offered- Tnis is precisely tne requirement that the intuitive criterion imposes. '^ We
demonsirate That an alternate contract with this property exists Therefore, by invoicing the
intuitive criterion, an equilibrium with partial bond expropriation and an associated
compensating differential would be undermined through the offering of such an alternate contract.
Since the firm tionors the equilibrium contract and since the NEC_ is more restrictive
m
than the NEC..., , workers will not perceive expropriation risk at the contract C
,
regardless of
their beliefs, if / > '-'
,
tnen the firm should be able to lower ,if' while Keeping the coniract
in stale ,r, accepiaole, as long as workers' revised beliefs were unaffected We show that this car;
be oone, acair; by invo^ioQ the intuitive criterion. Therefore, an equilibrium with ,i'„ > )>\_
rn u
would be underminec. Note that this argument is not applicable to rule out ihe possibility that
V^, > •'' .when worker s would perceive expropriation risk at the contract ^' were it offered by
the firm vvhen its internal price equals /??
Lemma 1 Suppose the separating equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion. Then
( i) //^, = //„ = 1 , ( ii ) /^ = '/ , and ( iii) if K > 0, then ^v = e.,= 1
.
/?.' .' / -V? U III I i
PrrjQV We first show ihat H - 1 and that if V > 0, then e = 1 . Suppose not. Consider an
rri u m
alternate contracUonstructed from ^ , call it ^ , where /'>'' ^W ,5 ^H d +c,form m rn m rn rn m
.^„. = P-
...
+ ( \- e^)L
^. !n essence, the contract C has a slightly larqer effective bond than
h'f.. , the eftective bond resultmq from C , wittiout the expropriation risk. It also places
ni III ' fn f- r-
'* C^o snd Kreos explain the intuilive criterion as follows
i am sendiog niessacie m which ought lo convince you thai I know /' For I would never wish
lo send rr/ ;f ! know t
.
while if i know /"
.
and it" sending this nnessaqe so convinces you. then
as you can see, it is in my interest to send it
Ihe y^or>-ers who shirk under C into the reserve nool , alonq with those workers alreacN- in them
Tfit'c^'f;. dog! under C
,
and then averages the fee tne firm is colleciing from the formerm
^B ->•'-_, with A . Note that when ^ isacceptabieand when workers emoloyed under ^m m m m m
put forth effort, the effective labor input and the wage rate under both contracts are the same. In
this case the firm has the same lifetime discounted value when it offers C as when it offersm
C , regardless of its internal price.
Since either H < 1 or <? < 1 , ^U^^ [ ^^^^ *{\- 1^) Uj\l{ I + r ) for c sufficiently
small, i.e, there is no expropriation risk under ^ Moreover, $ > min(Z ^^n^^^M-
minfZ /[l-e(l-(? )]Z ,1) = 5 , for u = /77, A/, since <? < l-e(l-^ ). Thus, when
i?„, > andp(a ,,C ) = 1 , the NSC is satisfied as a strict ineguality under C and, therefore,
employees necessarily put forth effort under this contract.
Since C.^ IS ootimal when the firm's internal price is N , it must be that
^'" V/^^K''^^^)-'^'^^^-';.^^'
When ( 7) holds as a strict ineguality, which we assume for now, the intuitive criterion requires
thatpla
"^fr}^~ ^- Thecase where (7) holds as an equality is considered later in the proof.
When 6>_ > 0, the E.AC for the contract C can be written asm m
(6) ;^- -1 -(]-// )Z? ^ ^
,
"^
'-^-
^
m mm 1 ^- /•
<l-l>Vr// - 'u '
mint
M rVu
\^-i^-e^)o]L^ r
When 6' 1 , the EAC for the contract C can be written asm m
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(9) -(i-9)(i-.^,j/?^ ^ ^^TT^ ^^
Similarly, the RAC for the contract C^ can be written as
t>H [\-e )L {V -y )
^^^' FTTT71 ^
n't
( I - ^ ) //t; rrnn{/?^ .max[0,Z^ -[ l -(1 - e^^ )ej z,^^ ]'K />; - /'^. ) _ ^
/? ( 1 + r "i /??
We will now show that (6)-( 10) irnoiy contract acceptarjiiitv for C Since th^rf- 1-, nnm
shirking and no expropriation under ^ and since f l-( l-r' )9!Z le L
,
(3) implies them IV m iTi iTi
EACfor^ indeed, this condition holds as a strict inequalitv when ,V < ! Similarly,
in m ^
multiplying(9)by(l-^ )Z^/[^_,^(!-r^)Z^],(iO}L)y Pl{R^-{ l-^^)/^i,ana
addinq the results implies the RAC (or ^ In this case the condition holes as a sir ict mequal iiv
tn
when e^ < 1 and either H < 1 or A' , > 0, When the EAC holds as a strict inequality the firm can
offer an alternative contract which yields higher profits by offering a slightly lower wage than
W When the RAC holds as a strict inequality the firm can offer an alternative contract whh:>
yields hioher profits by charqinq a slightly hiqher fee than F Moreover , from tne intuitive
criterion workers should be certain that the internal price of the firm is m when they observe
this alternate contract
.
since (7) holds as a strict inequality This shows that H = 1 and r' = i
when K > 0, Similar reasoning rules out ^' > v
.
since were this the case (S) would hold as a
strict inequality and the firm would have an incentive to upset the equilibrium by lowering its
wage offer.
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We turn to the Ccise where ( ?' holds '-s an eoualUv. Alter the contract C Vj ihe contractm
C
.
were the two contracts differ onlv tr; me^r waae rates a^d '^noiovrnent leve^. L ~L~m - ' ' n' m
di ,^\)^^ dL )s small out Dosnive, and W
,^
- W^^{k m^^ fDXK i J)i2- Wjx^iL^. Then
Tx's m,C ) >U(/n,C ) and III /V, C ) < ri'' /"/, C^ ). Thus, the same araumem. as civen abovemm m m
can be applied to the contract Cm^
A Similar construction can be given to generate the contract Cj^ Observe that if H.^ < 1
,
then fi^^l^^^[]-si\-e^)] = [ dO'^H ]- d) l/^^]/{ \ ^ r) ^ [ dO'^^^i ]~ d) l^^^j/i \ ^ r). Thus,
when /A. < 1 the firm prefers C^ to C^^
,
given that its internal price is /?? , since C^
involves less bonds to exprooriate than C^ When i=., < 1 , either the firm prefers C^ to C^,
t1 i1 ' t1 t1
Qiven that its internal once is m , aqam because C^ involves less bonds ^o exorooriate than
Cm , or an alternate contract, C
^
,
can be constructed so thai m m , C^ ' - ri' -'
.
C .. ) enc
n( /V, Cm) > n( df ,Cm) The construction is the same as the one Qtven in the Daraci'aDh aboven n
except that in th^s case Z ^, ^ Z ^, is 'equired SS
Let Wr, denote the workers' reservation waqe inclusive of the disutility '^^i effort, Wn -
A " n
1 + rK /( 1 + r). Since ^ = K i K^., it must be that W\ i ,'?-„ ^
''^'m-
indeed, by taMnq
u u ni 1 1 111 h 1
1
account of the properties of equilibrium given in lemma i , one can solve for tne rent per worKer
resulting from being employed when the firnVs internal price is dl
M u r *d
:r ?r -r
Let L^ be implicitly de.tined
'^i m\\ z^^ ) = W r,. Note that L < L^, even when H^ <
H'. '^ It follows that L^'^L.,\ for if not , n ^, ^ n( dl ,C^ ) From ( 11 ) and the fact that ( I -A III// / / m
19 Were Z >Z ,. the firm could do oetler by iowerinq its employment to Z„, .putting Z -Z„ workers
into the reserve pool when L ^ '> Z_. or cuttinq its waqe by ( I-Zj )Z^ ( 1^^,- ''' )/*! + /•)( 1/Z_-1/ Z
1^ m :) -i I M N u mm
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t-) IS trie tranj'.tion prob.^tul'ity from stale '?/ to state A/, the expected aiscounted rent per worKer
wnen tne t^rrn s iriterna! price is ?',' cind tne tirrn's employment is i is
mini i,,// ,1 -i :-/.'• '''n i',.- /' ,\i' + ,^') *^^ By invokinq an araumerit similar to the one Given
/ / • > t/
m trie proot oi iemma 1 , rnere is no ioss in assuming that the firm extracts ail future rents
accruing to its worKers wnen its interna! price is m . Then from (11). lemma 1 , and assuming
there are no redundant workers in the reserve pooi we nave
(12) V^Z) = min(-^,li ,;, ^ ^y/)=/'^^-^-^(/).
^^, -^--^^^^^ and /?Jl) =max(Z^,- Z,Oi
Note -Pa' ^!"'- v/e-r ioecuality restnctino ^ necessarily nolds as and equality only v/nen the
NcC hiOGs In essence, all tnat is left for tne firm to choose when its internal or ice is m is its
level of employn^itint Thus the problem which determines the firm's optimal contract when its
internal p'" 'ce equals /?? can he written as
: f , ^ .J , ,- , r i ,. L r ' r- I , \^ , III / '(13)
,
_.^" m\{L)-iy^l^r^^L^ Subject to [— /^(Z)]Z i '"
,
, ^ ^^,
Since Z is the solution to ( 13), it is evident that either Z = Z ^ or the N£C_ binds in
.?;• /77 /77 m
eauilihni.irn Note that in ( 1 3) .-'^Z ,., is the value of the rents which the firm can extract from
Its workers, both from its empia/ees, m the form of v/age reductions, and from the workers in
its reserve pool , directly in the form of entry fees. Observe that this amount is fixed, regardless
of the choice of emiplcr/ment level.
''vhen / '^ /. Thai suct^i an alternative contract would be acceplaMe follows tiy a similar arqument to
the one given m tt"ie proof of lemma 1
T A
"" It 15 appropriate to compule these rents from the point of viev/ of play in stage three, after acceptance
of the current contract has already occurred.
Tnere i:> no reason for the firm to taKe any costly action in oraer lo convince its
wor r.force that its internal price is /// , both because workers don't earn any rents and because
workers view oond ex'propriation to be more likely in this state. When the firm's internal price
is A'', {t]e situoiion is reversed. There may very well be a reason for the firm to pay a cost in
order to convince its employees of its true internal price. For workers to be so convinced, the
wage- employment pair
,
( i^^U ), must satisfy the following signaling constraint, SC
( 14) i/^ > /77i ( £ )- f^Z ^max (
^^^-JT^
—
.^,^./ on.
where f.,{ Z ) - 1/e - f^,{ L ) and FA L )= min{Z .,/Z ,i)( l-<?)( V/.f /r^)/( r^ d), the
expected discounted rent per worker when the firm's interne! price is A/ and its employment is Z
.
When ( 1 4) is satisfied, the firm has no incentive to offer the wage-employment pair ( '<P\l )
when ir, state /:?, Thus, when the contract satisfies the 5C and the firm in the hign productivity
state benefits from offering such a contract, workers' revised beliefs should place all the weight
on the firm being in the high productivity state, by the intuitive criterion Observe that when
f'V.. > kV.-., that is, the firm utilizes efficiency wages, then 6\., < Z^_ , i.e. , there is less reliance
A/ A' ' ^ /Y ,^
on performance bonds when the firm's internal price is A* than when the firm's internal price is
/T/
. as one's intuition would suggest. Note however, that Z? < 1 /e in this case.
The problem which determines the firm's optimal contract when its internal price is A/
is given by
maximize
(15) ; .A M- M/ r ( / \ F/\il)- WL
Subject to :. (
1
4), the SC, and 3^^{L)L <
( 1 + /' )
Note that the lower Poured constraint on W in ( 1 5) Is just the EAC Observe that when the 50
binds, the lower bound constraint on ^V may not bind This is the case where efficiency wages are
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i.it.-il-ize<j it seeiTis reasonattle to view the sigrialing constra';rit , -y^'nera 't rrr.ght be bmciinQ, as an
uDward siODinc cu'-ve in emDicymenl-waGe SDSce, at ieasl wnen the contract vio^atec. tne NEC-
^
.-'
The slope of an isoprofii curve (or the firm with current internal price eoual to A' is given by
The slope of the SC is given Py
(17) ^^ ^ ^^-22
ir-iOfuer :o restrict attention to the case where this intuition applies, we mats,e the fcilowing
assumption.
A^-
That is, we restrict attention to equilibrium values of ^'^v which satisfy an upper bound
constraint It is straightforward to show that under assumption 1 , ( /I' - B ^..)/ m •' W'JN
Thus, it follows from ( 16) ana (17) that when the equiliPnum is given Pv me tangency ot an
isoprofit curve and the SC, both curves must be rising, as long as assumption 1 is satisfied.
This assumption is innocuous for low values of 8 but is restrictive when 9 is near 1
V. Characterizing the Equilibrium
!V.! FuH Boncing touilibrium,
It 13 evident from (15) that when the 3C aces not bind in equilibr lum then the CAC must
Dmo, i.e.
, y/^^ = W^ - /y.. by invoking the same argument as tne one usea in the proof of lemma
'' Note that when we graph the SC we treat t*-' rather than L as the dependent variable.
-' The 5looe of the SC given in the text is only correct for L '- L ^ When L > L then aiong the SC we
(iW m f( L )-W ^\lt
I When Ihisocturs it must r.ie that ,",,, = and >'/,_,= >f'',-,. !p this case i>' ,i^\. _!/e We
refer tosucn an eGuiiibnurr; as a fail DonGinrjequiiibnurrK since aii of theeiTi:i:ovi?BS' mCenTive to
put forth eitort is provided via pertormance ponas. In a full Ponding eGuiiipriurn , /
.^^
= y'^,
-
V
. Thus, one would not associate such a con'ractuai eauilibnum wiih involuntary
u
unemployment, however , a full bonding equilibrium may be inefficient, relative to the first oest,
because the NEC may bind, yielding a corner solution in ( 13), because the SC may just bind,
yielding a corner solution in ( 15), or the NEC., may bind, also yielding a corner solution in ( 15).
Let Z/y be implicitly defined by //]'( Z/y) = Wr,. Then full bonding equilibrium can be
characterized as follows.
Proposition 1 : In a full Donamg equi Ivoc uim which satisfies the miuiti ve enter ion ana
assumption 1
> *
( i) either Z^, = L^ or L^ ' Z^, , the NEC^ is binding, and 3^^ = 1 /e, 5nd
( ii) either L^ = Zyy or Z .. < L^^ in which case 5 ^^. = 1 Z6. In the latter case either 'he SC
bindsand( A/-/7?)f'(Z;^) i IZeor the NEC., binds.
// 1
1
Proof : ( i) follows immediately from e.Kamination o^' ( 1 3), From examnnation of ( 1 5) 't follows
that when its internal price is M the firm chooses its single per lod profit rriaxim.izing employment
level , if both the SC and the NEC^ do not bind. When either the SC or the NEC,, binds, the firm
I i i i
does not utilize redundant bonas, i.e., B .. = 1 ze. When the SC binds, it must be thai an increase in
r/
employment, accompanied by the required wage increase to satisfy the SC. does not raise firm
profit. This yields the c-ondition, ( /Z-/77)f'( Z..) < ize. SS
Proposition 1 says that deviations from the single period profit ma.^imizing solution
occur because there is risk of bond expropriation, either by thefirmi when its interna! price is
m
.
directly through its own contract offer or indirectly through the SC by masquerading as if its
i.^J
inierna' pr:ce '^vere '", v Dy "se mt- v^hen it? intemai orice 13 /Y direoily through Us own
cor^:r3Cv offer v/r;pr 5 fu; : oonding equ^^triurn exisT? where the SC binds, ^.Jx^. conaition that the
firm ^'inds w o;::t;rr;a; to oav workers lust tneir reservation wage when its internal price is M
i.T.pnes That 11 rr,;jst be too oostiy i\\T tne firm to signal its type so that it can expand Us
employment Noie that m a separating equilibrium , deviations from single period profit
miaxim ization cannoi occur in both states. However , it is possible to have a full bonding, pooling
equiiiDnum where Z^, = z .,. the NEC is binding, the SC is binding, and it is too costly for the
firm 10 signal its type so that it can raise employment when its internal price is M.
iV.!i Efficiency V/dge EGuilibriurr!
When the ^C Dinos in ( ' 5 j jna >4v, '* >'^''o- F^^ ^•''- ''1^'^' oavs Us worKers above tneir
/ / hit
reservation v.age :.: :V,gnai tha: ".:.:'. miernai \:)T\z^ is M . 'We refer to such an equilibrium as an
efficiency waae ecurMurium. Ooiv.rve that this is miore likely to occur the qreaier is the
difference, n- m
,
anc the qreaier is the quotient, /7/m
. We characterize efficiency v/age
equ ; 1 1 u r 1 um as f \ I ov^ s.
P'rooosition 2 : in an e:ficient7 wage equiiiDnum which satisfies the intuitive enter ion and
assumption \
(0 either /
„^,
= L
^^
or Z^^. < Z^^ , the NEC^ bmds, ano B = 1 /e-/" , and
(11) L^^L^,, rn^-.i^^)- ^r^y. z^^,= i/e-/-/,^,and/77l-(Z/^)^z?,.^i M'(Z/.^) if
the NEC^, doesn't bmc tnen A/f'( Z ^) < m{'{ Z ^)+ 1 /e
II / / //
Proof ( i) fo'lows ;rimed)atelv from examination of (13), Since the SC binds, it follows from
( 14) and (15) that 5,, = I /e - f.. V/hen the NEC^ doesn't bind the first order condition for
the optimal emp!i>/ment level m ( 15) is
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As-iurriDticn i oar' De rRwrnteri as f,^. > ^-'^a /V- /t? )/ A^ Sut'StUutina in.? into the Tirst
v-eauelitv IP ( * ) ana suDtracting .^i'^, frem both sides yieids
if
It fellows that riyi l^.) > >v'^^, Irom which Z .. < Z/y also follows When the NEC., does bind the
first orcer condition for the optimal employment level in ( 1 5) is lust the first inequality in
(*). The remaining argument is similar to the one just given. SS
When efficiency wage equi iihnum exists and the NECr.., doesn't bind, which we assume in
the following discussion, there will be a continuum of such equilibria. See figure 4 for
C'cp ificat ion on this coint. We focus on the particular member in this class which yields the
highest vclu.e o'' the firm , where the firm's isoprofit curve in state M is tangent to the 50 from the
ioVi 2^
-i'V 'his member is depicted as point A in figure 4. From proposition 2 it follows that there i;
underempVjymen* m such an equilibrium. We can now reconcile this underemployment result
with the charging of up front fees when the firm is m the low productivity state. First, note that
ttic firm cannot charge the up front fees in the high productivity state, because doing so would
violate the oC Thus, the best the firm can do to recoup the rents it pays its employees m the
pr.ocess of signaling is to chacige fees in the low productivity state Observe that all the rents are,
m fact, recovered by the firm but the outcome is not as good as it would be were the firm able to
charge the fees in the high productivity state. The difficulty is that the firm cannot credibly
precommit to a higher employment level when in the high productivity state When the firm
pays efficiency wages m the high prcductivity state it, in effect, creates a positive externality for
the firm in the low productivity state, because the entry fees are collected m the low productivitv
-^ Observe thai B ^, il)l i5 not differentiable at Z - Z „. Thus, there will be a kink in the SC al this
entploynient levt^ti Because of the kink in the SC there need not be a tangency betv/een the SC and the
relevant isoprofit curve ;ri equilibriunv
"^ Since this tangency occurs at the kink in the SC, what we n-iean is that the isoprofit curve is tangent to
the curve generated by the constraint (14), as written, ignoring the possibility of job rationing.
isoprofit
curves in
state M
^^
L^ Lt L^ ^M
Figure ^
state and the magnitijce oi the enirv tee cepends on the size of the eft iciencv waoe Sequent ia
i
ratinnaiitv necessitates that ihe firm rnaxim^ze current Denoo protit when deciding whicn
contract to offer . ruling out tne possioilitv that the firm internalizes this apparent externality
This IS why the equilibrium is inefficient.
This view of firm equiiibrium differs fronri the standard efficiency wage equiiionum. The
signaling aspect of equilibrium offers some very interesting hypotheses concerning wage
determination. For example, larger scale firms, those with higher values of //, should pay higher
wages, as should firms v/hich have greater volatility in their value. Thus, this signaling approach
provides an explanation for industry-vviae v^age differentials which does not require assuming that
fTioniioring intensity vanes across firms, the standard explanation of wage differentials proviced
by efficienc/ wage theory. -^
iV.l!; Ruiinq Out Comoerisatinc Differentials in Poolino Equilibrium
The signaling equilibrium whicn v/e have demonstrated is not contingent on workers'
initial beliefs, as long as workers are noi certain that the firm's internal pric^ is A/. This result
may appear puzzling if workers are almosi certain that the firm's internal price is A/, why
should the firm engage in costly signaling'-' That is, shouldn't a pooling equilibrium prevail in this
case'i^ In such a pooling equilibrium p , =a .and there will be a small amount of expropriation
risk. The expected capita! loss that a worker faces in such a pooling equilibrium isp ./^. and the
effective performance bond, i.e. , the value of the performance bond net of the expected capital
loss, is ( 1 -p .)f. Let Alp ,) denote the expected future rents per worker in such a pooling
equilibrium.
( 1 8) n^^) = ( 1 -p p( 1 - d)( W,^- w^)i{r^d). -6
25seeKatz(l986).
-^ Again, this assumes thai employment in the pooling equilibrium does not exceed L
n'
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Trier; r?, = l/ie ( i-p .)]-.'^(B ,)/M-|3 ..'and >>',= >/>-/"(? J +P ,r.. Note that ine cont^acT
wage contains a term whict^ eauais the exDec'ec caDital loss due to Dond exoroDr^ct^on in the
i'oiiowing proDOsition we show tha; sucn pooiing equilioria are inconsistent with ihe mtuitive
criterion.
Proposition 3 : if the equilibnuni satisfies tne intuitive criterion ana « ^ > , then tnere Goes not
exist a pooling equilibrium where the firm pays a compensating differentia:
Proof : Were such an eouilibnum to exist, then fi,- yV, = I /e - V/'r,, independent of p .. Thus, astin ;
long as employment stays constant, the firm has no iricentive to affect p _. when its internal pr-ice
eauals /77. However, ;H-' is increasing in p ,, so the firm has incentive to signal its internal p"'C?
wnen ihis price equals A'. In particular, if ine firm were to offer an aUema'econtraci wnere the
bond was reduced by d^^, the wage was reduced bv p . d^^; and emoloyment was slightly lowered,
then the intuitive criterion implies that workers snouid be certain that the firm s iniernai price
is A/ upon observing this alternate contract Indeed, as long as workers are certain tnat the firm
is in state A/ upon ooserving the alternate contract, it follows that the alternate contr.act has ootn
a larger effective bond and a larger effective wage tnan the original coniraci, Tnus. worker:,
should both accept the alternate contract and put forth effon. once ine contraci is accepted. Tne
availability of such an alternate contract undermines the pooling equilibrium, .S.S
Notel : When a , = the araument in the proof of proposition 3 breaks down, since 'nere is no
need to pay a compensating differentia! m this case. Indeed, C* is discontinuous at a
.
= 0.
Note 2 : It might appear that there exists pooling equilibrium wher e there is no risk of oond
expropriation but where the waoe paid is less than 'fVr,. In such an eduilibnum, , the firm fines
r.
that signaling to expand its employment is too costly, wnen in state A/, and the i''(^T^ fines it
ad^'/antageous to pool to avoid paying a nigher w.age, when in state m. By essentially the sam,p
orgiiiTient 3; Ine cne a^ven in :r<e or oof of Droposition 3 , one Cori ai^o ruie ou* s^jcn ooOi ing
eqiJiiibriG
Yl. Conclusion
In the bocv' of the paper we treated the firm's monitoring intensity as exogenous. We now
briefly consicer tne implications of the firm choosing its level of monitoring Standard
theoretical argument suggests that the optimal level of monitoring is essentiaily zero, since
monitoring requires real resource cosis and incentives can he maintained hy simply increasing
the size of the purishmient v/nen detection occurs This argumien: ignores the issue of hov^ societal
norms restrict tne size of punishments ^"^ Our paper suggests anctner proolerr, which miiigates
against the use of arpiiraniy large punishments. Tnese punisnm.enTs canr.ct oe maae crediPIe
without the firm; ceviaring from its first Desi employment levels This suagesis that there is a
tradeoff between monuor jng cosis. on the one nana, ana aiiocaiicnai costs via underemployment
,
on the other. From tne perspective oi posiiive tneory , tnis tradeoff implies that optim.al
contracting eguilipnum does not yield first Pest employmient levels' Tnij follows since the
marginal monitoring cost is positive while tne marginal cost 10 altering the iaoor allocation from
its first best level is ess-entially zero.
Before closing, we turn to one last point concerning interpretation, in eguiliPrium of our
model , the firm, never expropriates the performance Ponds Vv'e Pelieve tnat expropriation may
occur in actuality This leads to the question of how expropr lation might he mann'esr Vve have
modeled the firm moral hazard under the assumption tnat the firm goes out of pusiness once it has
expropriated performiance bonds and, consequently, our model miay suggest to the reader that
expropriation occurs via tne firm declaring banicrupic^/ Tnis interpretation is valid as long as it
is the firm , rather than the firm's creditors, which receives the proceeds from bond
-' jee note 4.
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pvpropricit'iO!'^'. However
, we diG noi intend '^or- ihe ipiterpre'a'.ion o'' our modsi to be restricteo to
tne C3?e whe'^e ':ie 'ir " aecia^es uari^-ruptcv indeed, in lignt of trie recent rage of lakeover?
apparent.iv trOi v/a:ea Pv suPSion;iai returns (rem laoor basning and, assuming that, most bonding
in actuantv i :-: impiicit and occurs as aeferred wages, our preferred interpretation is tnat
expropriation occurs when new management, less bound by implicit commitments with employees
than was the previous management, bargains down wages by utilizing the threat of massive layoffs
in the event that the wage oill is not substantially reduced. 2S Whether this phenomenon is
actual ly an exampte of bond expropriation or merely the predictable outcome which results when
diligent management succeeds turf protecting management is moot. Certainly, the issue is
sufficiently provocative to warrant furtner researcn.
Oft
-^ Schleit'er and Sumiviers ( 1Q&7) make essentially the same point
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